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Environmental Disclosure and Targets in Environmental Reports: 
Impression Management or Legitimacy Theory. 
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Environmental reporting within the annual report has increased in frequency and length 
over the last few years. Despite this growth, relatively little is known about the 
reporting, content and subsequent monitoring of environmental targets that may form 
part of environmental disclosure. Further, their unregulated nature means that 
management have great discretion when reporting.  
                                      
This paper adds to research in this emerging area. In particular, it explores a relatively 
unexplored area of corporate reporting the use by companies of environmental targets. 
In a longitudinal study, we look at the reporting of environmental targets by 20 UK 
companies from 2004- 2008. We find widespread use of targets. We also find evidence 
of a difference in usage between those companies that are in high –impact 
environmental sectors and those that are in low-impact environmental sectors. First, we 
find that, in general, high-impact companies use more targets than low-impact ones. 
Second, overall we find that companies prefer to use less precise targets (in terms of 
quantification and time period specified). However, high-impact companies used much 
more precise targets than low-impact companies. Third, overall we find that companies 
disclose those targets that they meet while not disclosing those that they have missed. 
However, once more we find that it is the high-impact companies that are most likely to 
disclose targets that they have not met. 
 
Overall, therefore, these findings are consistent with the idea that companies are 
managing their presentation of targets. However, high-impact companies appear to be 
presenting more detailed information and more negative information. This is consistent 
with legitimacy theory in that these companies are using environmental disclosures as a 
means of signalling their commitment to the environment. 
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Environmental Disclosure and Targets in Environmental Reports: Impression 
Management or Legitimacy Theory. 
 
Introduction 
 
An important trend in recent decades has been the increase in environmental reporting within 
the annual report and elsewhere, for instance stand alone reports. The voluntary nature of 
environmental information contained both in the annual report and in the stand alone 
environmental report has been subject to considerable research activity (see, for example, 
Hughes et al 2000, 2001; Patten 2002; Wiseman 1982).  
A particular area of interest has been the association between voluntary environmental 
disclosure in the annual report and public relations/ impression management. In other words: 
is the voluntary environmental disclosure driven by a wish for companies to present 
themselves to their relevant publics/ users in a favourable light. Such motivations would be 
consistent both with the Voluntary Disclosure literatures which suggest that good performers 
will disclose more information to signal their good environmental performance (see Dye 
1985; Verrechia 1983; Clarkson et al. 2008) and the Impression Management literature. 
Studies on voluntary presentation disclosures, such as graphs (Beattie and Jones 1992 ,2000, 
2008) and photographs (Mckinstry 1996; Preston, Wright and Young 1996; Campbell, 
McPhail and Slack, 2009) have suggested that companies attempt to present themselves in a 
more favourable than unfavourable light. A variety of studies have also found that companies 
with good environmental performance present more information than bad environmental 
performers (e.g. Al-Tuwaijir et al. 2004; Clarkson et al. 2008).
1
 There is also a body of 
research literature which states that those companies with a high impact upon the 
environment disclose more than those with a low impact.  
                                                          
1
 There have, however, been some countervailing studies (e.g. Patten 2005; Cho et al 2009)  
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Although there have been numerous prior studies on environmental disclosure involving 
content analysis (e.g. Neu, Warsame and Pedwell 1998; Harte and Owen 1991; Raar  2007), 
there has been, to our knowledge no studies at all on managerial environmental targets. This 
is somewhat surprising for several reasons. First, most companies that provide environmental 
disclosure within the annual report produce targets of some sort (whether they be called 
objectives, budgets, aims or targets).
2
  Second, these targets are important indicators of future 
managerial environmental plans and such forward looking environmental planning is 
politically important given, for example, the environmental concerns expressed at global 
conferences such as Kyoto, Rio de Janeiro and Copenhagen. Third, over time, it is possible to 
track whether companies have met, changed or discontinued these targets. Fourth, the 
disclosure and measurement of environmental targets provides a new forum in which to test 
the voluntary disclosure and impression management theories.  
In this study, we have three main research objectives. First, to describe and document, for the 
first-time, the use of environmental targets used as part of environmental disclosure within 
annual reports. Second, to test the interrelated theories of impression management and 
voluntary disclosure in a novel, unregulated research environment. Third, to test whether 
high-impact environmental companies have different disclosure policies to low-impact 
environmental companies.  
This research makes three important research contributions. First, it provides information on 
how management uses and abuses managerial targets in environmental reporting for the first 
time. This adds a new dimension to the environmental disclosure literature. Second, it 
provides new evidence, from an unexplored research area, to test the voluntary disclosure and 
impression management theories. And, finally, it provides new insights to the relationship 
between industrial sector, environmental disclosure and impression management.  
                                                          
2
 From now on we use ‘targets’ to describe any forward-looking projection by a company that can be 
quantified in some way (even if the company itself does not quantify it)   
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide a literature review 
which outlines, in particular, the prior findings into the association between environmental 
disclosure and impression management. Then we outline our methods in section 3, which 
principally consisted of content analysis. In section 4, we present two sets of findings those 
which describe environmental disclosure and those related to impression management. In the 
final two sections we then discuss our findings within the context of the prior literature before 
we offer some conclusions.  
 
Literature Review: Environmental Disclosures. 
There is significant literature surrounding the relationship between environmental 
performance and the levels of disclosures offered by firms, dating back as far as Ernst & 
Ernst‟s annual report surveys of the mid-1970s (Ernst & Ernst, 1973). A large number of 
studies on environmental disclosures (e.g. Cho & Patten, 2008; Freedman & Stagliano, 2002; 
Gamble et al., 1995; Kreuze et al., 1996) report that, whilst the extent of environmental 
disclosures varies across time and across markets, the level of information tends to be 
somewhat limited. Also, despite endless resources and studies in the past 35 years (e.g.  Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Fekrat et al., 1996; Freedman and Wasley, 1990; Hughes et al., 2000 & 
2001; Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Patten, 2002; Wiseman, 1982), certain elements, such as 
environmental target monitoring and reporting, have not to our knowledge been studied. The 
US Government Accountancy Office (GAO) investigated corporate environmental 
disclosures in July 2004 (GAO, 2004). Within this report, the GAO suggests that the 
difference in levels of disclosure could be attributed to differences in the materiality of 
environmental spending/exposure across firms. However, they argue that without access to 
company information, it would be impossible to assess whether inadequate disclosures are 
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down to non-compliance or the lack of progress made with regards to measuring 
environmental performance.  However, there is no evidence to support these claims.  
Early studies by Dye (1985) and Verrecchia (1983) found evidence to suggest a positive 
association between environmental performance and the level of discretionary environmental 
disclosure; this later became known as the Voluntary Disclosure Theory (VDT). This 
economic-based theory further suggests the idea that those superior environmental 
performers, with an active environmental strategy, will focus on using environmental 
performance indicators which inferior firms find it difficult to imitate (Clarkson et al., 2008). 
Poorly performing companies, by contrast, will choose to disclose less, and sometimes no, 
information with regards to their environmental performance (Clarkson et al., 2008).  Thus, 
from a VDT perspective, superior environmental performers disclose their „green‟ credentials 
to signal their proactive strategy.  According to Lang & Lundholm (1992), a firm‟s 
performance must exceed some threshold value before it warrants incurring the cost of 
disclosure, and the more sensitive a firm is to the perception of outsiders, the greater the 
levels of disclosure.  Their evidence provides additional weight to VDT, as it suggests that a 
firm will increase levels of disclosure year-on-year if performance is improving.  However, 
they also indicate that an absence in disclosure will lead to investors or other stakeholders 
assuming the worst possible scenario. Dye (1986) implies that information may not be 
disclosed if it reveals proprietary information. Dye (1985) and Jung & Kwon (1988) show 
that, if it is uncertain whether a firm actually possesses information about its value, then one 
with negative information can choose not to disclose, and pose as an organisation which 
possess no information at all. Verrecchia (1983 & 1990) shows that when it is costly for 
companies to disclose information, then only those with positive news will see it as 
worthwhile to actually incur the cost and disclose the information.   
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More recent studies by Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) and Clarkson et al. (2008) support these 
findings and highlight a positive association between environmental performance and 
environmental disclosures. Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) found that superior performers provided 
more extensive quantifiable disclosures of environmental information than inferior 
performers. Clarkson et al. (2008) further claim that superior environmental performers 
disclose more purely discretionary information, as predicted by the economic-based VDT. 
Also, Brammer et al. (2006) found “Less indebted companies with dispersed ownership 
characteristics are significantly more likely to make voluntary environmental disclosures, 
and that the quality of disclosures is positively associated with firm size and corporate 
environmental impact.” 
There is, however, some countervailing evidence, Rockness et al. (1986) and Freedman & 
Jaggi (1992) found the association between environmental performance and levels of 
disclosure to be statistically insignificant. In addition, Hughes et al. (2001) found that poorer 
U.S. environmental performers tended to make the most disclosures, consistent with their 
responsibility to report contingent liabilities under SFAS 5. However, although these 
disclosures differed between groups, these researchers found them not to be useful in 
classifying the firms‟ actual environmental performance. 
Cho et al. (2009) examined three potential explanations as to why some companies disclose 
their environmental capital spending while others do not. They found that “on average across 
time, the disclosed environmental capital expenditure amounts do not appear to be in excess 
of quantitative materiality thresholds, suggesting that the choice to reveal the spending is 
discretionary”. This would seem to add additional weight to the theory that those companies 
who do not disclose this information choose not to do so due to little progress being made. It 
further suggests that disclosing companies see this as adding  strategic value. Conversely, 
Cho et al. (2009) also found evidence to suggest that it is not always the superior 
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environmental performers who disclose the most information.  However, their study is only 
based on large firms from a small number of industries and focuses solely on one aspect of 
environmental performance: Toxic Release Inventory, which means it cannot be generalised.  
Clarkson et al. (2008), whilst suggesting that socio-political theories (such as stakeholder and 
legitimacy theory) are not robust in predicting the level of discretionary environmental 
disclosures, found firms with unfavourable prior year media coverage are more likely to 
make soft claims (i.e. not readily verifiable) of being committed to the environment. This 
behaviour cannot be attributed to economic disclosure theories such as VDT, which assume 
truth-telling. Thus, socio-political theories do indeed explain additional patterns in the data. 
Socio-political theories predict a negative association between environmental performance 
and level of discretionary environmental disclosures. According to Patten‟s (2005) study 
based on 355 sets of projected/actual spending drawn from 10K reports for fiscal years 1993 
through 2002, there are two problems with the current state of environmental disclosures. The 
first is a lack of compliance. Patten (2005) found only a relatively small percentage of 
companies even disclose environmental spending. This adds robustness to previous studies by 
Larrinaga, Carrasco, Correa, Llena, and Moneva (2002) with respect to environmental 
reporting in Spain, and by Adams, Coutts, and Harte (1995) relative to discrimination 
disclosures in UK. Secondly, Patten (2005) argues most disclosures are more misleading than 
helpful, and claims poor environmental performers face more political and social pressures, 
along with threatened legitimacy, and will tend to adjust stakeholder perceptions of the 
companies via an increase in discretionary environmental disclosures. Patten (2005) echoes 
Gray and Bebbington‟s (2000) concerns that environmental disclosures are a legitimating 
device and not an accountability measure. In order for it to become an accountability 
measure, the accuracy, rather than the quantity, of disclosures needs to be improved. 
According to Bewley & Li (2000), VDT suggests that companies are using disclosures to 
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signal an “unobservable pro-active strategy toward   environmental concerns relative to 
poorer performing firms”; legitimacy theory (see, Deegan, 2002) argues that environmental 
disclosures are primarily used as a tool to reduce exposures to social and political pressures. 
Cho et al. (2009) provide additional support for legitimacy theory over VDT as they found 
that firms with worse environmental performances are more likely to disclose spending 
amounts than superior environmental performers. However, a number of studies (see, Cho 
and Patten, 2007; Clarkson et al., 2008 & Patten, 2002) provide conflicting results.  Barbara 
Young, CEO of the Environment Agency, believes that, despite the obvious improvement in 
disclosures from 2004-2007, the levels of quantitative disclosures on environmental risks that 
are financially material to shareholders and potential investors remain relatively low (Trucost, 
2007).  
 
Overall, therefore, the prior literature on the association between environmental performance 
and environmental disclosures is mixed. The majority of studies support the Voluntary 
Disclosure Theory which argues that companies will disclose more environmental 
information if they are good environmental performers. However, a significant minority of 
studies suggest the reverse finding, consistent with legitimacy theory, that poor performers 
will produce more environmental information than good performers.  
So far, there have been no studies which have sought to test environmental performance 
against the disclosure of managerial environmental targets. Using the prior literature it is not 
possible definitively to hypothesise whether environmental performance will be positively or 
negatively associated with the nature and disclosure of environmental targets.  
We draw up the following broad hypotheses:  
1. Companies will, ceteris paribus, provide general rather than specific targets.  
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We believe this to be true as it would enable companies the latitude to interpret the 
results in a favourable way.  
2. Companies will, ceteris paribus, disclose more targets which are met than those which 
are not met.  
We believe this to be true as this would portray them in a better light.  
3. Companies will, ceteris paribus, replace failed targets with softer targets.  
We believe this to be true as this would portray them in a better light.  
4. Companies from industrial sectors which have high impact on the environment will 
provide higher levels of disclosure than those companies with low impact.  
We believe companies will do this as high-impact companies will be seeking to 
legitimate their activities.  
 
Method 
We selected companies and related environmental disclosures within their annual reports 
covering the period 2004-2008. Ten of these from companies with a high-environmental 
impact and ten with a low environmental impact.  These categories were selected with 
reference to the prior literature. We followed prior research which has shown a difference 
between environmentally-sensitive and non-environmentally sensitive industries (e.g. Cho 
and Patten, 2007; Jose and Lee, 2007; Raar, 2007).  The companies are listed in Table 1.  
.                                              Insert Table 1 about here. 
We collected information on all environmental targets disclosed over these 5 years. This 
enabled us to track any changes in these targets over time. Also, more particularly, it enabled 
us to see whether the company‟s met their self-set and self-monitored targets. It should be 
stressed that the level of Social Environmental Reporting Assurance which is currently 
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undertaken by companies is currently unknown. Therefore, it is not at all certain that these 
internally-generated and disclosed environmental targets are subject to any assurance at all.  
From the 100 environmental disclosure sections we analysed we collected five different sets 
of information. First, we collect the number and value of the individual targets set (this 
comprised overall number of targets, nature of target by environmental area, time-period 
covered and specific maturity dates). Second, we recorded on a longitudinal basis whether the 
targets which were set were, in fact, met. Third, we tested whether the population of failed 
targets were replaced by softer targets. Finally, we collected data on attribution to see 
whether companies attributed the successful meeting of targets to themselves and 
unsuccessful meeting of targets to the environment.  
 
Findings  
We analysed the contents of the twenty companies over five years from 2004-2008.  We took 
2004 as the base year. We recorded the existence of any targets in the appropriate 
environmental report section of the annual report.  We used a standardised research 
instrument. In Appendix 1 we present an example from one company. The data was collected 
by a research assistant. It was then checked by one of the researchers. We thus measured the 
targets in subsequent four years against 2004 as our benchmark. Our results are presented 
below. When we set up our study we were particularly motivated to explore differences 
between dirty companies and clean companies. These companies were, as discussed earlier, 
drawn up with reference to the prior literature 
Overall, as shown in Table 2 we found that there were 267 targets disclosed across the 20 
companies over the 5 years (on average this was thus 2.67 targets per year).  Generally, the 
number of targets disclosed was relatively stable ranging from a high in 2004 of 57 to a low 
in 2007of 49.  Consistently, high impact sector companies disclosed more targets than 
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cleaner, low impact sector companies (on average 2.9 as against 2.4). Individual companies 
ranged from Barclays and Xstrata both with 20 targets over 5 years to Charles Stanley and 3i 
Group with 10 targets over 5 years. 
                                          Insert Table 2 about here 
In Tables 3 and 4 we present data on the type of targets that were disclosed.  We classified 
the targets into four. In these two tables, we show only initial targets set in all years. It can 
thus be seen that after 2004 where 26 targets were recorded for clean companies and 32 for 
dirty companies then only 6 new targets were introduced by those companies in 
environmentally sensitive industries as opposed to 16 targets that were set by those in 
environmentally less-sensitive industries. 
 These are displayed below in terms of specifity. 
Targets by type 
Type 1 Generic target, not quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions) 
Type 2 Target quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions by 10%) 
Type 3 Generic target, time period specified (e.g. reduce emissions by 2010) 
Type 4 Target quantified and time period specified (e.g. reduce emissions by 10% by 2010) 
                                        Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
We thus start at Type 1 with very general targets with no quantification and no time period.  
These targets thus do not pin companies down. They were very popular and overall were the 
second most popular target. They were especially popular for clean sector companies. The 
next level of specificity was where the time period was not specified but the quantity was. 
These two types of target where there was no specification of time constituted the majority of 
the targets 46 out of 80 targets. This was particularly true for clean sector companies where 
27 out of the 42 targets were Types 1 and 2. Type 3 targets are specific in that they specify 
the year but not the quantity. Perhaps surprisingly these targets were not much used. 
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Interestingly, the most specific type of target where both time and quantity were specified, 
type 4 targets, were used in 32 instances. Perhaps contrary to expectations companies were 
thus on certain occasions prepared to specify targets in some detail. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 show subsequent reporting (or lack of reporting) on targets. In table 5, 2004 is 
high year due to all initial targets captured in that year for the period of study. Subsequent 
years show new or amended targets only and do not double count targets outlined earlier. In 
Table 5 all the targets for the environmentally low impact companies are tracked. There are 
157 targets tracked across the four types with 58 being Type1 and 46 being Type 4.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
In Table 6 all the targets for the environmentally high impact companies are tracked. There 
are more targets for these companies with 175 targets tracked across the four types. For these 
companies, there were far more Type 4 targets with 87 being Type 4, 47 being Type 1 and 36 
being Type 2.   
                                     Insert Table 6 about here 
 There were four categories for reporting on targets. These are shown for each year in Tables 
5 and 6. 
Cat 1  Target met and disclosed 
Cat 2  Target NOT met and disclosed 
Cat 3  No disclosure (not known whether met or NOT met) 
Cat 4  Replacement/new target. 
In general, given the evidence of impression management from the prior literature one might 
expect that behaviourally firms might be expected to disclose when they were meeting 
targets, but not disclose when they were not.  As alternatives to not disclosing failed targets 
companies might decide to not disclose the target at all. Thus, it will be unclear as to whether 
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the target was met or not. Or alternatively the targets might be replaced with a new target. To 
provide an analysis of this we provide a summary of disclosure categories in Tables 7 and 8.  
Like Tables 5 and 6 they provide data both on category and type, but in this case the data is 
aggregated. Table 7 provides the data for the environmentally low impact companies while 
Table 8 provides the data for the environmentally high impact companies.  
 
In Table 7 the most popular category of target disclosure was when the company had met its 
target. This occurred in 50 cases out of 131. There were also 52 cases where there was no 
disclosure of the target in subsequent years or where the target was either replaced or 
substituted with a new target.  In total these case totalled 102 out of 131 cases. There was 
thus only a minority of cases where the companies disclosed a target that they had not met. 
                                          Insert Table 7 about here 
In Table 8 which concerned the environmentally sensitive companies once again the most 
popular category of target disclosure was when the company had met its target. This 
happened in 58 cases out of 143. However, Unlike the Environmentally low impact 
companies these high impact companies also more often disclosed when they had failed to 
meet their targets. From the impression management theory this result is unexpected as it 
would seem that both sets of companies would not with to disclose bad news. However, it is 
congruent with legitimacy theory where environmentally sensitive companies might be 
wishing to appear honest and transparent in their reporting.  There were also 26 cases where 
there was no disclosure of the target. This is much less than for the environmentally low 
impact companies. Also by contrast to the environmentally low impact companies, 
environmentally sensitive (high impact) companies disclosed far fewer instances where the 
targets had been replaced. 
                                          Insert Table 8 about here 
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We, therefore, found different patterns of disclosure between the environmentally low impact 
companies and environmentally high impact companies. In particular, environmentally high 
impact companies were more likely to disclose when they had not met their targets. Further 
analysis of the data by the specific content of the disclosures will help to clarify whether 
these differences in disclosure are affected by the nature of the targets disclosed. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Environmental Reporting has increased in frequency over the last few years.  
It is used by companies to present a wide range environmental information.  However, even 
though environmental reporting is widely used and has a considerable literature base in the 
voluntary disclosure area, relatively little is known about the reporting, content and 
monitoring of environmental targets provided by companies in their environmental 
disclosure.  This paper provides information and discussion about this understudied but 
common element of disclosure. The unregulated nature of environmental reporting means 
that management have great discretion about which targets to report, the form of that 
reporting and the consistency of that reporting over time. 
                                      
We look at the reporting of targets by 20 UK companies from 2004- 2008.  These 20 
companies were drawn equally from high- and low- impact environmental companies. The 
use of a longitudinal study allows us to track targets over time. We find widespread use of 
targets. We find 267 targets across the 100 firm years studied. We also found evidence of a 
difference in usage between those companies that are in high –impact environmental sectors 
and those that are in low-impact environmental sectors. First, we find that, in general, high-
impact companies use more targets (2.9 per company) than low-impact ones (2.4 per 
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company). Second, overall although we find that companies prefer to use less precise targets 
(in terms of quantification and time period specified)we found that  high-impact companies 
used much more precise targets than low-impact companies. Third, overall we find that 
companies disclose those targets that they meet while not disclosing those that they have 
missed. However, once more we find that it is the high-impact companies that are most likely 
to disclose targets that they have not met. 
 
This research tested impression management and legitimacy theory. The findings are 
consistent with both theories. Overall, companies do appear to be managing their presentation 
of targets. However, high-impact companies appear to be presenting more detailed 
information and more negative information. This is consistent with legitimacy theory in that 
these companies are using environmental disclosures as a means of signalling their 
commitment to the environment. 
 
This research represents a first step to investigating the way in which companies use targets 
in their corporate reporting. It would be useful to investigate the use of target-setting in other 
reporting contexts such as social or risk disclosure in the annual reports or in other 
geographical areas.  
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Table 1: Sample of companies from high impact “dirty” and low impact “clean” sectors 
 
 
Table 2: All targets, met and not met disclosure for all companies for all years 
 
Year Low Impact Sector High Impact sector Total 
2004 26 32 58 
2005 28 28 56 
2006 21 29 50 
2007 23 26 49 
2008 23 31 54 
Total 121 146 267 
 
 
 
Table 3: Low impact sector – Targets by type 1-4 
 
Year Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Total 
2004 11 8 0 7 26 
2005 2 1 0 5  8 
2006 1 1 0 0  2 
2007 0 2 1 2  5  
2008 0 1 0 0  1 
Total 14 13 1 14 42 
Type 1  Generic target, not quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions) 
Type 2  Target quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions by 10%) 
High Impact “dirty” companies  Low Impact  “clean” companies 
BHP Billiton  
Centrica  
Xstrata  
BP  
Cairn Energy 
Anglo American  
Lonmin 
Rio Tinto 
Rexam 
Tullow Oil 
Marks & Spencer‟s  
J Sainsbury  
Tesco 
Barclays 
Next 
Mothercare 
Charles Stanley 
3i Group  
Friends Provident 
HSBC 
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Type 3  Generic target, time period specified (reduce emissions by 2010) 
Type 4 Target quantified and time period specified (reduce emissions by 10% by 
2010) 
 
 
Table 4: high impact sector – Targets by type 1-4 
 
Year Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Total 
2004 7 6 1 18 32 
2005 3 0 0 0  3 
2006 0 0 0 0  0 
2007 0 3 0 0  3  
2008 0 0 0 0  0 
Total 10   9  1 18 38 
 
Type 1  Generic target, not quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions) 
Type 2  Target quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions by 10%) 
Type 3  Generic target, time period specified (reduce emissions by 2010) 
Type 4 Target quantified and time period specified (reduce emissions by 10% by 
2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
: 
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Table 5 tracks all 2004 initial targets –Low Impact Sector 
 
Year Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Total 
2004 initial 
targets 
11 8 0 7 26 
2005      
Cat 1 7 5  3 15 
Cat 2  2  3  5 
Cat 3 4 1  1  6 
Cat 4 2 1  5  8 
total 13 9 0 12 34 
2006      
Cat 1 5 3  3 11 
Cat 2 2 3  3 8 
Cat 3 4 2  1 7 
Cat 4 1 1   2 
total 12 9 0 7 28 
2007      
Cat 1 5 4  4 13 
Cat 2 2 3   5 
Cat 3 4 3  4 11 
Cat 4  2 1 2 5 
total 11 12 1 10 34 
2008      
Cat 1 3 6  2 11 
Cat 2 2 3 1 5 11 
Cat 3 6 3  3 12 
Cat 4  1    1 
total 11 13 1 10 35 
Total 58 51 2 46 157 
Type 1  Generic target, not quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions) 
Type 2  Target quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions by 10%) 
Type 3  Generic target, time period specified (reduce emissions by 2010) 
Type 4 Target quantified and time period specified (reduce emissions by 10% by 
2010) 
 
Cat 1  Target met and disclosed 
Cat 2  Target NOT met and disclosed 
Cat 3  No disclosure (not known whether met or NOT met) 
Cat 4  Replacement/new target 
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Table 6 tracks all 2004 initial targets –High Impact Sector 
 
 
Year Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Total 
2004 initial 
targets 
7 6 1 18 32 
2005      
Cat 1 4 3 1 8 16 
Cat 2 2 1  6 9 
Cat 3 1 2  4 7 
Cat 4 3    3 
total 10 6 1 18 35 
2006      
Cat 1 3 3 1 5 12 
Cat 2 5 2  10 17 
Cat 3 2 1  3  6 
Cat 4      
total 10 6 1 18 35 
2007      
Cat 1 6 2 1 3 12 
Cat 2 3 2  9 14 
Cat 3 1 2  6 9 
Cat 4  3   3 
total 10 9 1 18 38 
2008      
Cat 1 7 5 1 5 18 
Cat 2 2 2  9 13 
Cat 3 1 2  1  4 
Cat 4      
total 10 9 1 15 35 
Total 47 36 4 87 175 
Type 1  Generic target, not quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions) 
Type 2  Target quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions by 10%) 
Type 3  Generic target, time period specified (reduce emissions by 2010) 
Type 4 Target quantified and time period specified (reduce emissions by 10% by 
2010) 
 
Cat 1  Target met and disclosed 
Cat 2  Target NOT met and disclosed 
Cat 3  No disclosure (not known whether met or NOT met) 
Cat 4  Replacement/new target 
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Table 7: Summary tracks all 2004 initial targets –Low Impact sector 
 
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Total 
Cat 1 20 18 0 12 50 
Cat 2 6 11 1 11 29 
Cat 3 18 9 0 9 36 
Cat 4 3 5 1 7 16 
total 47 43 2 39 131 
Type 1  Generic target, not quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions) 
Type 2  Target quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions by 10%) 
Type 3  Generic target, time period specified (reduce emissions by 2010) 
Type 4 Target quantified and time period specified (reduce emissions by 10% by 
2010) 
 
Cat 1  Target met and disclosed 
Cat 2  Target NOT met and disclosed 
Cat 3  No disclosure (not known whether met or NOT met) 
Cat 4  Replacement/new target 
 
 
 
Table 8 tracks all 2004 initial targets –High  Impact Sector 
 
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Total 
Cat 1 20 13 4 21 58 
Cat 2 12 7 0 34 53 
Cat 3 5 7 0 14 26 
Cat 4 3 3 0 0 6 
total 40 30 4 69 143 
Type 1  Generic target, not quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions) 
Type 2  Target quantified, no time period (e.g. reduce emissions by 10%) 
Type 3  Generic target, time period specified (reduce emissions by 2010) 
Type 4 Target quantified and time period specified (reduce emissions by 10% by 
2010) 
 
Cat 1  Target met and disclosed 
Cat 2  Target NOT met and disclosed 
Cat 3  No disclosure (not known whether met or NOT met) 
Cat 4  Replacement/new target 
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Appendix 1 
Environmental Disclosures: Performance Monitoring 
Company: J Sainsbury Plc 
Sector: Food Retail 
Year 1 – 2004 
T1 – Increase the efficiency of the transportation of products. (CSR – 2004, p.34) 
T2 – Reduce Carbon Dioxide Emissions by 10% per square metre (CSR – 2004, p.34) 
T3 – Reduce waste sent to landfill by 10% (CSR – 2004, p.34) 
 
 
 
Year 2 – 2005 
T1 – “Efficiency of distribution systems has improved” – Target Met – Present (CSR – 2005, p.82) 
T2 – CO2 reduced by 11% per square metre  since 2000– Target met – Present – New Target 5% by 2008 (CSR – 2005, 
p.82) 
T3 – Reduced packaging by 18% relative to turnover from 1999 – Target met – Present (CSR – 2005, p.82) 
 
 
 
Year 3 – 2006 
T1 – Road mileage reduced by almost 5% - Target met – Present (CSR – 2006, p.12) 
T2 – “Progress made” – Target not yet met – Present (CSR – 2006, p.12) 
T3 – “In line with of increasing recycling relative to turnover” – Target met – Present (CSR – 2006, p.12) 
 
 
 
Year 4 – 2007 
T1 - “On Target” – Target met – Present (CSR – 2007, p.11) 
T2 – Target changed to 25% by 2012, previous target not mentioned – Not met – Not Present (CSR – 2007, p.11) 
T3 – “On Target” – Target met – Present (CSR – 2007, p.11) 
 
 
 
Year 5 – 2008 
T1 – “On Track” – Target met – Present (CSR – 2008, p.20) 
T2 - “On Track” – Target met – Present (CSR – 2008, p.20) 
T3 – Achieved a 2.6% reduction, “on track” – Target Met -  Present (CSR – 2008, p.21) 
 
 
 
 Specific and consistent targets & dates  
 Softer target in 2006. 
 
